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HONDURAS: Coup d'Etat
- What's In a Name?
Analysis by Diana
Cariboni
MONTEVIDEO (IPS) - The events unleashed two
weeks ago in Honduras have raised questions about
the options available in a democratic system to
penalise infringements of the constitution without,
in turn, trampling the constitution.
Was it or was it not a coup d'etat? On Sunday, Jun.
28 hundreds of soldiers surrounded the presidential
residence, stormed in, ordered President Manuel
Zelaya out of bed at gunpoint and herded him onto an
air force plane that flew him to Costa Rica, still
in his pajamas.
The question is obviously rhetorical. Nevertheless,
it has been asked dozens of times over the last two
weeks in op-ed columns, blogs, articles and analyses
posted on-line by local and foreign media outlets.
And more than a few have said no, it was not.
The Honduran constitution drafted in 1982 does not
provide for impeachment of the president. That
possibility was eliminated in a 2002 constitutional
reform, along with the guarantee of immunity from
prosecution.
The constitution also has a series of articles set
in stone, such as the ones on "reform and
inviolability of the constitution", and others
referring to questions like the form of government,
national territory and a total ban on presidential
reelection.
The constitution has its own built-in armour to
protect it. Article 375 states that the document
does not lose its validity even when it has been
supposedly revoked or modified by any means or
procedure other than those provided for by the
constitution itself. In such cases, any citizen,
with or without political authority, has the duty to
help maintain or restore respect for the
constitution, the article adds.
That doesn't mean the constitution cannot be
amended. In fact it has been modified dozens of
times since 1982. To do so, all that is needed is
the vote of two-thirds of all members of parliament
at two consecutive regular annual sessions.
The armour consists of blocking all routes to the
creation of a constituent assembly to completely
rewrite the constitution and thus "refound" the
state.
The current constitution was drafted in 1981 by a
constituent assembly that met under military
tutelage – characteristic of political life in this
country for a good part of the 20th century – and
amidst a broader Central American context of
guerrilla warfare, dictatorships and U.S.
interference.
Nevertheless, since then the country began to build
institutions that it previously lacked, in the areas
of electoral, judicial and human rights issues,
access to public information, and transparency in
state finances and procurements.
But nearly three decades of fragile democracy have
brought neither prosperity nor development to this
country of 7.5 million people, where eight out of 10
people live on less than a dollar a day according to
United Nations statistics.
Indeed, Honduras is the third poorest country in
Latin America, after Haiti and Nicaragua.
In the last few years, trade unions, social
movements and associations of small farmers as well
as small left-wing parties and movements have begun
to take a keen interest in the experiences of
countries with leftist or centre-left governments,
like Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, where
constituent assemblies were elected to rewrite the
constitutions, which were later approved by voters.
Zelaya, a wealthy landowner and relative outsider
within the centre-right Liberal Party, was elected
on a reform agenda in 2005. Once in office, he
gradually distanced himself from his party and the
country's elites, and ended up pushing for the
creation of a constituent assembly which by any
reckoning ran counter to the constitution.
The opposition, the courts and Congress maintained
that his aim was to secure the possibility of
running for reelection in order to prolong his stay
in office, following in the footsteps of Hugo Chávez
in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales
in Bolivia, and Álvaro Uribe in Colombia.
However, Zelaya himself never said that was his
objective, and any possible modification allowing
for reelection would have come after the end of his
term in January, so he could not have aspired to a
second consecutive term.
The Supreme Electoral Court is the only institution
that can call elections, in agreement with Congress,
the constitution states.
When the justice system and election authorities
ruled that Zelaya could not ask voters whether or
not they wanted to elect a constituent assembly, he
said he would hold a "non-binding survey" and that
the National Institute of Statistics would be in
charge of the poll.
"Do you think the November 2009 general elections
should include a fourth ballot box in order to make
a decision about the creation of a National
Constituent Assembly that would approve a new
constitution? Yes or No" the ballot read.
To do this, he invoked article 5 of the Honduran
"Civil Participation Act" of 2006. Under this law,
all public employees have the right to call
non-binding public consultations to inquire what the
population thinks about policy measures.
If the "yes" vote had won in the informal poll,
which was to be held Jun. 28, a fourth ballot box
(alongside the three for electing the president,
lawmakers and local governments) would have been set
up in the November elections for voters to elect
delegates to a constituent assembly.
But the president found himself increasingly
isolated in the endeavour. In the week leading up to
the coup, the military refused to distribute the
ballot boxes and provide security for the poll, in
the first act of defiance towards their
commander-in-chief. Zelaya then sacked the head of
the armed forces, the Supreme Court ordered that he
be reinstated, and the president refused to do so.
The legislature then reached a decision that
appeared to address the crisis through democratic
channels: in the early hours of Jun. 26 it created a
special commission to investigate the conduct of the
president, who was accused of "failing to pay due
attention to questions of national interest and of
failing to comply with judicial rulings to the
detriment of the rule of law."
This process was based on article 42 of the
constitution, which allows Hondurans to be stripped
of their citizenship if they undermine the freedom
to vote, falsify or forge electoral documents, or
use fraudulent means to manipulate the people's
will, and also forbids inciting, encouraging or
supporting the reelection of a president.
The lawmakers also invoked article 205, which says
the legislature has the authority to decide whether
charges can be brought against the president, to
approve or disapprove of the administrative conduct
of the executive branch, and to name a special
commission to investigate matters of national
interest.
The commission asked for time to carry out its
investigation. In the meantime, the Attorney
General's Office and the Supreme Electoral Court
warned that if the president went ahead with the
Sunday, Jun. 28 poll, he would be violating the
constitution on the abovementioned grounds, which
would be sufficient reason for his removal.
In any case, it was necessary to wait until Sunday.
Word on the street was that the 'yes' vote would
win. But no one knows if that would have happened:
the troops got up early and ousted Zelaya.
Shortly afterwards, with the president kicked out of
the country, the judiciary hurried to report that
the action had been ordered by the courts, and
Congress held a session in which a supposed letter
of resignation by Zelaya was read out, after which
the legislators voted to remove him.
But what happened between Friday and Sunday to
prompt that outcome?
Police and judicial sources who backed the coup, and
who spoke to IPS correspondent in Honduras Thelma
Mejía, said things shifted on Saturday, when a
presidential decree was circulated announcing that
the survey would be held on Sunday. The decree was
dated May 26, but had been quietly published in the
Official Gazette between Thursday Jun. 25 and Friday
Jun. 26.
That decree "changed the rules of the game,"
according to the sources, because it "opened the
door to the dissolution of the rest of the branches
of government" by no longer calling for "the
inclusion of a fourth ballot box" but for "A Public
Opinion Survey to Convene a National Constituent
Assembly."
They argued that on Sunday afternoon, a triumphant
Zelaya planned to dissolve the rest of the branches
of government and to instal a constituent assembly
made up of representatives who were even alleged to
have been secretly appointed.
It would seem implausible that the president had the
manoeuvring room to take such a major step, with the
courts, the Supreme Court, Congress and the
electoral authorities lined up against him. And
above all, the military had rebelled against his
orders.
Perhaps a portion of the citizenry would have backed
him – the same groups and individuals who have come
out to protest on the streets since he was deposed
and sent into exile. But it is mere speculation to
say whether that support could have shifted things
in his favour.
A night-time curfew, a government-imposed media
blackout and a brutal crackdown on protesters have
belied claims of the democratic nature of the regime
appointed by the legislature on Jun. 28, led by then
head of Congress Roberto Micheletti, which has
earned Honduras the most complete international
isolation in its history.
The de facto government alleges that this was the
only way to curb what they term Zelaya's
"authoritarian" tendencies.
Perhaps after all Honduras really does need a new
constitution. |
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