COLOMBIA:
Pawns of War - The
Hostage Crisis
Analysis by Ana Carrigan
LONDON, (IPS) - "Mr.
President, we who are
going to die send you
our greetings." The
Sept. 26, 2006 message,
addressed to Colombian
President Álvaro Uribe,
came from a hostage held
by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), along with
eleven other provincial
legislators, since April
2002.
As of September 2006,
the lawmakers had been
held in a guerrilla camp
in the Amazon jungle for
four and a half years,
waiting, with
diminishing hopes, for
the government and the
FARC to begin
negotiating a
hostage-prisoner swap.
Nine months later, 11 of
the 12 legislators were
dead -- among them the
young man who had
predicted their fate.
They died in
circumstances that
remain murky. But one
thing is clear: unable
to end over four decades
of civil war, Colombians
are increasingly turning
for help, not to the
United States, but to
Europe and the rest of
Latin America, a dynamic
that has been fuelled
since August by
Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez’s attempts
to broker a solution to
the hostage crisis.
Occasionally, the
outside world hears from
the hostages via videos
released by the FARC to
prove that they are
still alive. Since Uribe
rejected negotiations,
every video carries
urgent pleas not to try
to rescue them by force.
Recently, a police
officer held hostage
sent word that "a
military rescue is the
equivalent of a death
sentence."
Among the hostages held
by the FARC (a rural
insurgent group that
rose up in arms in 1964)
are former presidential
candidate Ingrid
Betancourt and her
running-mate Clara Rojas
-- who now has a little
boy, the product of a
relationship with a
guerrilla fighter -- as
well as eight other
politicians.
The hostages also
include 14 army officers
and non-commissioned
officers, 20 policemen,
and three U.S. military
contractors.
The rebels want to
exchange the hostages
for some 400 imprisoned
guerrillas, as well as
two who were extradited
to the United States,
alias "Sonia" and "Simón
Trinidad".
Like the endless armed
conflict, the fate of
the hostages is mired in
a legacy of mutual
hatred. In 1983, the
FARC killed Uribe's
father in a botched
kidnapping attempt.
Over the past year,
Supreme Court
investigations and
trials of so-called "para-politicians"
have uncovered secret
ties between allies of
Uribe, including members
of his family, and
paramilitaries guilty of
committing atrocities
against the rural
civilian population
accused of supporting
the insurgents. The FARC
has refused to talk to
the government until it
withdraws the security
forces from a given
area, in order to create
a demilitarised zone.
Uribe, meanwhile,
refuses to withdraw
troops from "one single
millimetre" of Colombian
territory. In spite of
discreet efforts by the
governments of France,
Spain and Switzerland to
facilitate a
hostage-prisoner
exchange, the war has
repeatedly stymied their
hard work.
In the meantime, the
rightwing Uribe denies
that Colombia is in the
grip of a civil war, and
insists that there is
merely "a terrorist
threat to a democratic
state" from a group of
"bandits."
To fight these "bandits"
-- the leftwing rebels
-- his government
receives around 630
million dollars in
military aid a year from
the United States, hires
mercenaries, and
finances British,
American, French and
Israeli experts to train
mobile commandos who
infiltrate FARC
territory, identify
targets, and call up air
strikes on anything that
moves.
The Colombian rainforest
is a war zone where the
hostages are trapped,
like ducks in a shooting
gallery. The 11 hostages
were killed somewhere
inside the estimated 40
percent of the national
territory controlled by
the FARC (basically
rural, sparsely
populated areas)
The rebel group
announced the deaths on
the Internet on Jun. 28,
saying they had been
killed in crossfire on
Jun.18, when "an as-yet
unidentified military
group" attacked the camp
where they were being
held.
In a televised address,
Uribe accused the FARC
of killing the hostages
in cold-blooded,
premeditated murder. He
said the army could not
have attacked the camp
since they did not know
where the hostages were
located, and Defence
Ministry dispatches
claimed that no
operations were carried
out in that part of FARC
territory on Jun. 18.
When the news reached
Geneva on Jun. 28, the
French, Swiss and
Spanish delegates were
busy assessing the
results of a 24-hour
Jun. 16 meeting with the
FARC.
Sources in the Colombian
capital reported that
the visit by the
mediators, their seventh
to the jungle this year,
had made substantial
progress. An agenda for
talks towards a
prisoner-hostage swap
was agreed, and the FARC
had started to follow
through on a schedule of
steps aimed at building
a climate of mutual
trust and confidence.
When the delegates
learned the hostages
were dead, they
contacted the FARC in
the jungle to demand an
explanation, according
to reports from sources
in Paris.
But the FARC leadership
knew nothing about it;
they could not
understand how the
camp's security had been
breached, and they had
no notion as to where,
when, how or why the
hostages had been
killed. They reportedly
kept repeating over and
over: "This is a
catastrophe! A total
catastrophe!"
They immediately grasped
the implications and
understood that the
tragedy could destroy
any possibility of an
eventual
prisoner-hostage
exchange.
This year saw increased
international backing
for a swap. Seven
Democratic lawmakers
from the U.S. came out
in support of a proposal
set forth in December
2005 by France, Spain
and Switzerland for a
"meeting zone" where
negotiations to secure
the hostages' release
could take place with
security provided by the
three European countries
and the International
Red Cross.
Then on May 17, Uribe
spoke to his generals,
urging them to launch
rescue missions and
release Betancourt and
the other hostages by
force. This prompted
action by newly
inaugurated President
Nicolas Sarkozy of
France, for whom the
liberation of
Betancourt, who holds
dual Colombian and
French citizenship, is
"a matter of utmost
priority."
Incensed by Uribe's
speech, Sarkozy called
Bogotá.
Uribe rescinded his
orders for a military
rescue, and also
released Rodrigo Granda,
Colombia’s
highest-ranking FARC
prisoner.
By August, there was
still no information as
to how the hostages had
been killed. But there
were suspicions that the
"unidentified" military
group which the FARC
said attacked the camp
had done so with the
knowledge of the army.
Clues about a military
operation that wiped out
a guerrilla camp began
to circulate on the
Internet, and a
plausible reconstruction
of the event was
published by IPS
journalist Constanza
Vieira.
According to Vieira's
account, several members
of the FARC unit
guarding the hostages
had deserted on the eve
of the killings.
Suspicions of
infiltration spurred the
removal of the hostages
by motorboat at dawn.
Allegedly, they died on
the river when their
boat was ambushed by a
Colombian military
commando backed up by
army helicopters.
In August, under heavy
pressure to resume
contacts with the FARC,
Uribe appointed
opposition Senator
Piedad Córdoba, who had
enlisted the support of
President Chávez, as
facilitator. When the
Venezuelan and Colombian
presidents met in
Bogotá, they agreed that
Chávez would help broker
a prisoner-hostage
exchange.
The Chávez-Córdoba team
moved swiftly to break
the deadlock. In
response to the
Venezuelan leader’s
offer of a neutral
territory for talks,
FARC leaders agreed to
travel to Caracas, and
even to hold
negotiations in any
neutral area. That means
their demand for a
demilitarised zone in
Colombia would apply
only to the actual
exchange of hostages for
prisoners -- a major
concession.
International support
for Chávez’s efforts
grew. Most importantly,
the George W. Bush
administration sent out
clear signals that it
was waiting for a
concrete proposal from
the FARC to begin
negotiating the release
of the three U.S.
military contractors.
Sarkozy remains strongly
engaged. Spain,
Switzerland, Bolivia,
Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador,
Nicaragua and the ruling
coalition in Uruguay
have also offered
support. Senator Córdoba
is currently in
Washington. So why the
delay? What is holding
up the promised meeting
between Chávez and the
FARC?
A meeting with the FARC
scheduled for Oct. 8, to
which U.S. legislators,
Venezuelan officials,
and relatives of the
hostages were also
invited, was postponed
when Colombian Defence
Minister Juan Manuel
Santos refused to
provide guarantees that
the FARC delegates would
not be arrested when
they tried to cross the
border into Venezuela.
What is Uribe up to?
Does he really want to
negotiate the release of
the hostages? Some in
Caracas say he is
himself a hostage to
hard-line sectors of the
Colombian right who are
opposed to peace and
intend to block any
agreement for a
prisoner-hostage swap.
Whatever the answers,
several things are
clear: the hostage
crisis has taken on an
international dimension
and Uribe has lost
control of Chávez's
initiative.
The ball is now in the
FARC's court. Offered
this opportunity by
Chávez to escape the
"terrorist" label, will
they use it wisely? Do
they recognise the
urgency of the
situation? Do they see
that their own future is
now irrevocably linked
to that of the hostages?
And when they meet with
Chávez, will they bring
proof that the remaining
hostages are still
alive? Will they
reciprocate the release
of Granda, and free one
or two hostages? Will
they put forth concrete
proposals?
The questions abound,
but so far the answers
are slow to come.
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