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MIGRATION-US:
The Myth of Low-Wage Warfare
Analysis by
Peter Costantini*
SEATTLE, Washington, (IPS)
- How could it be that an influx
of less-educated workers from
poor countries would not
significantly harm low-income
U.S. workers?
If the labour market were a
zero-sum game, there might be
fierce competition between them.
But experts say other factors
compensate for increases in the
supply of low-wage labour and
soften its effects.
"American labour markets appear
to be rather segmented,"
according to Douglas Massey,
co-director of the Mexican
Migration Project at Princeton
University. "There are certain
sectors where foreigners enter
and they complement Americans in
production and don't really have
any displacement or wage
effects."
Massey pointed to agriculture as
the clearest example of this
segmentation. There have been
few white farmworkers since the
1930s, he said. To attract them,
employers would have to raise
wages considerably. But if they
did this, the produce would end
up being imported from abroad
because that would be cheaper,
or farmers would find it
economical to mechanise more
jobs.
Although competition may exist
in some areas between immigrants
and native workers, its main
impact falls on a declining
number of U.S. workers. Among
all immigrants, the proportion
who did not finish high school
is about 38 percent, according
to the 2000 U.S. Census. For
illegal immigrants, the figure
is closer to two-thirds. Of the
U.S.-born workforce, the
proportion of high-school
dropouts is much smaller, under
15 percent, and in urban areas
it has fallen by more than a
quarter over the past two
decades.
Low-wage immigrant workers may
foster economic growth in the
areas and industries where they
work.
When firms profit from the cheap
labour of immigrants, they
sometimes respond by reinvesting
that money in expanding their
production. When they do, this
increased capital investment can
create new jobs.
Angelo Amador, director of
Immigration Policy at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, pointed to
the example of meat-packing in
Nebraska. "The factories were
closing and people were moving,
there was more unemployment and
the wages were going down," he
said in an interview.
"Once they had this influx of
immigrants to work at these
factories, some of the closed
plants reopened and the economy
around the area actually picked
up. And they found that the
wages even went up."
There is a potential multiplier
effect, too: when an industry
like meat-packing expands, it
can create jobs in firms that
provide equipment, supplies and
services to the industry.
In areas with booming economies,
when workers are needed to fill
jobs, immigrant workers can fill
gaps. Still, Amador said, there
should be some guarantees that
U.S. citizens will be able to
compete for these newly created
jobs.
Certain kinds of jobs would
likely have been moved out of
the country had immigrants not
taken them at lower wages here.
This is particularly true in
agriculture and manufacturing,
where U.S. businesses are
competing with Mexico and other
developing countries.
By contrast, firms that employ
immigrants may become more
competitive in global markets.
This can enable them to expand
rather than shipping the jobs
overseas. "People focus on
immigration," said Massey, "but
it's a globalised economy within
which all factors of production
except land are moving."
In the U.S., wages for
less-educated, lower-income
workers have been mostly
stagnant over the past three
decades. If immigration is not a
major cause of lower wages and
job losses, what are the more
significant pressures?
A ubiquitous factor has been the
automation and reorganisation of
work, which has relentlessly
reduced the demand for
low-skilled workers in many U.S.
industries.
In manufacturing, runaway shops,
outsourcing and sub-contracting
of some functions have
eliminated many manual jobs with
relatively good pay and benefits
over the past few decades.
But very little of this job loss
can be attributed to competition
from immigrants, who work mostly
in other sectors. The loss of
such jobs has mainly been caused
by the inability of U.S.
manufacturing firms to compete
with foreign ones and by
movement of their operations
offshore.
New York Times columnist
Nicholas Kristof describes a
neighbour he knew in his
childhood who earned 26 dollars
an hour in a union job in 1971.
For the last decade, he says,
the neighbour has had to work as
a janitor for not much more than
the minimum wage..
The long-term decline of labour
unions in the U.S., often
accelerated by union-busting,
has also helped depress wages on
the lower end of the scale. U.S.
labour laws that favour business
and an anti-union political
environment have increased the
difficulty of union organising
among unskilled workers, native
and immigrant.
At the same time, the long-term
decline in the
inflation-adjusted value of the
minimum wage has moved the floor
of the labour market downward.
Ruth Milkman, a sociologist at
the University of California at
Los Angeles, has found a
distinctive pattern in some
industries, including
construction and building
services, now dominated by
immigrants in Los Angeles. These
jobs had once been unionised,
offered relatively good wages
and benefits, and were held
overwhelmingly by U.S.-born
workers.
Starting in the late 1970s, she
told IPS, there was "a very
direct employer effort to
downgrade them, mainly through
destroying unionism". As the
jobs became less desirable,
native-born workers often left
voluntarily for the greener
pastures offered by other
sectors of a robust local
economy. Only after that process
did employers turn to
immigrants.
"So there really isn't any kind
of story of competition there,
it's an ethnic succession
story," Milkman asserts. "Wages
do go down, but I don't think it
has much to do with immigration.
Immigration is a result rather
than a cause."
For African-Americans, some
particular factors do far more
damage to their economic
prospects than competition from
immigrants, argues labour
economist David Card. A criminal
justice system that incarcerates
large numbers of young black
men, many for minor drug
offences, leaves them with bleak
job prospects when they are
released. Poverty-related
medical issues such as diabetes
and congestive heart failure are
exacerbated by lack of access to
medical care because many have
no health insurance.
Many forces have conspired to
reduce wages and job
opportunities for those at the
bottom of the labour force. At
the same time, many immigrants,
legal and illegal, have entered
the U.S. economy over the past
15 years.
Not surprisingly, a study by
Stephen Camarota of the
Washington-based Centre for
Immigration Studies found that
employment of low-wage
immigrants rose while that of
low-wage native workers fell by
more than twice as much from
2000 to 2005.
But according to Harry J. Holzer,
former chief economist at the
U.S. Department of Labour, these
findings "do not prove that the
former development caused the
latter." Rather than competition
from immigrants, Holzer
attributes the employment
situation of native-born U.S.
citizens primarily to "the
underlying weakness of the U.S.
labour market".
As Holzer testified before
Congress, "Of course, some
less-educated Americans have
been hurt by immigration, and
more importantly by many other
forces in the U.S. labour market
-- such as new technologies,
foreign trade, the diminishing
presence of unions, and the
decline in the statutory levels
of the minimum wage."
Rather than trying to curb
immigration, Holzer suggested,
low-wage workers would benefit
more from improving education
and training, increasing the
minimum wage, making it easier
to organise unions, and
providing more widespread child
care, parental leave and health
insurance.
The U.S. could also take a
lesson from the integration of
Spain, Portugal and other poorer
countries into the European
Union, suggests Carlos Gil,
emeritus professor of history at
the University of Washington.
"The Europeans created a social
fund for worker-retraining
programmes after they opened
their national borders and
created one single market. Why
can't we look for similar
approaches?"
*This article is the second of a
two-part series on the impact of
migration on the U.S. labour
market.
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