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RIGHTS-COLOMBIA:
The Convenient Disappearance of a Paramilitary Leader
Constanza Vieira
BOGOTA, (IPS) - ''The security forces must have some degree of responsibility''
in the vanishing of the head of Colombia's paramilitary umbrella group, Carlos
Castaño, a human rights lawyer told IPS.
Castaño disappeared on Apr. 16 after a gunfight in Urabá, a rural area in
northwestern Colombia, and his whereabouts remain unknown. However, rumours have
been circulating that he was killed or has left the country.
''The important thing is to determine who staged the attack, and in what
circumstances, because Urabá is a completely militarised and 'paramilitarised'
region,'' said Eduardo Carreño, who belongs to the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers'
Collective.
He was referring to the simultaneous heavy presence in the area of the army and
the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), the right-wing paramilitary
coalition headed by Castaño.
According to leading rights watchdogs like Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, there is abundant and compelling evidence of the close ties and
constant coordination between paramilitaries and government security forces in
Colombia.
Castaño, one of the paramilitary leaders who has worked closest with the armed
forces, vanished six days before the Supreme Court began to consider an
extradition request from the United States, where he is wanted on drug
trafficking charges.
Colombia is in the grip of a civil war involving leftist guerrilla groups that
rose up in arms four decades ago, paramilitary militias, and the armed forces.
In recent years, the drug trade has become a key source of financing for both
the rebels and the paramilitaries.
Castaño's disappearance ''is extremely serious,'' considering the crimes he
admitted to committing in his book 'My Confession', published in 2002, said
Carreño.
Castaño admitted to being the ''intellectual author'' of a large number of
assassinations and mass killings, which he justified ''saying that the people
killed were guerrilla fighters. But in the investigations it has been clearly
demonstrated that the executions were committed against totally defenceless
civilians,'' said Carreño, whose human rights organisation has won international
awards.
THE MAPIRIPAN MASSACRE
One example of Castaño's involvement was the July 1997 massacre in the
southeastern Colombian town of Mapiripán. Hearings related to that case have
been under way at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights since late January.
Carreño, as a member of the Lawyers' Collective, is representing the civilian
plaintiffs.
In Colombia, Castaño as well as several military officers have been convicted
and handed long sentences for their role in the massacre.
A retired army general, Jaime Alberto Uscátegui, is under arrest and will also
be tried in connection with the killings, although the trial was postponed twice
and rescheduled for May 11.
The mass killing took place in Mapiripán, a town of 1,000 in a key coca-growing
region in the southeastern region of Orinoquia, controlled by the country's
largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
In July 1997, 200 members of the AUC -- including 50 who Castaño sent in by
plane from Urabá -- surrounded Mapiripán. From Jul. 15 to 20 they closed off all
access routes by river and land and, death list in hand, dragged at least 49
unarmed civilians from their homes to torture and kill them.
The local judge, Leonardo Cortés, was the only local authority still in town.
The rest had left with their families eight days earlier.
>From his window, he saw the paramilitaries take several local residents to the
municipal slaughterhouse. For several days he heard the screams and pleading
coming out of the improvised torture centre as the victims were hung alive from
meat hooks and their limbs cut off with chainsaws.
According to Castaño, his men were killing people he claimed were guerrillas.
But Carreño says the victims were opponents of the municipal government, who had
accused the mayor and his associates of corruption.
''The people who were executed belonged to the Liberal Party or to the (leftist)
Patriotic Union,'' while the local administration was in the hands of the
Conservative Party, he said.
The day the killings began, judge Cortés telephoned Major Hernán Orozco,
commander of the Joaquín París battalion, who also received military
intelligence reports of what was happening.
Orozco asked his superior, Uscátegui, who was in charge of security in the
region at the time, to send in the 2nd mobile army brigade to protect the local
inhabitants. The brigade, consisting of hundreds of soldiers, was located in
Guaviare, four hours by road from Mapiripán. Its helicopter gunships were just
five minutes away by air.
But the army never showed up.
And Orozco was later ''threatened by the paramilitaries and by the military
officers who were responsible for what occurred,'' said Carreño.
Orozco is now living in exile under protection from the Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights. Judge Cortés, who also received warnings that he
should change his testimony, went into exile as well.
The terrified survivors of the town ''fled Mapiripán by river, road and plane,''
said Carreño as he reconstructed events in an interview with IPS.
No one returned. According to the human rights lawyer, the town is now inhabited
by ''people who are from outside the region.''
Castaño was sentenced in absentia to 40 years in prison in mid-2003. Colonel
Lino Sánchez, then-commander of the 2nd mobile army brigade, also received a
40-year sentence for helping coordinate the torture and murder operation.
Sergeant Juan Carlos Gamarra was sentenced to 22 years.
While the paramilitaries were carrying out the grisly killings in the
slaughterhouse, Sánchez was one of the officers receiving special training on
military planning at the army's special forces school on Barrancón Island, just
35 km west of Mapiripán.
The course was given by Green Berets belonging to the U.S. special forces.
Investigations have shown that the paramilitaries who were brought into
Mapiripán enjoyed military logistical support, using an airstrip controlled by
the Colombian armed forces, for example.
Three weeks before the massacre, Sánchez had suggested to the commander of the
local anti-narcotics base that he facilitate access to the area by the
paramilitaries, because ''they are fighting a common enemy, and could teach the
guerrillas a lesson,'' according to the records from the trial.
Although the anti-narcotics base refused to cooperate with Sánchez, it did not
report the colonel's request until six months later, under pressure from those
investigating the mass killing.
WHAT USCATEGUI KNOWS
In a telephone conversation that was leaked on Mar. 29 to the Bogotá magazine
Cambio, Uscátegui told an unidentified listener that he is innocent, and that he
is not going to take the rap for the massacre all by himself.
He also said that if he speaks out, it would be the country's worst scandal
ever, and could lead to the cutting off of U.S. military aid.
Colombia is the biggest recipient of U.S. military aid after Israel and Egypt,
through the Plan Colombia anti-drug and counterinsurgency strategy.
The justice system has kept certain information under wraps ''because it would
not be convenient for it to be made public,'' said Uscátegui.
The retired general described the content of 300 codified files that were found
in the computer belonging to Sergeant Gamarra.
Gamarra, who is serving a 22-year term, was head of intelligence in the Joaquín
París battalion, which was commanded by Major Orozco.
''The pamphlets that were handed out by the (paramilitary) self-defence forces
during the Mapiripán massacre were produced on that computer, in the París
battalion,'' said Uscátegui.
''The same was true of the pamphlets the (paramilitaries) handed out eight
months later in Puerto Alvira'' in the same region, where a similar mass killing
was carried out, he added.
Also found on the computer ''were the payrolls for the monthly payments to the
entire AUC front in Guaviare -- which consisted of 93 men and women: their
aliases, ranks and what they were paid,'' the retired general added.
In the conversation, Uscátegui mentioned a key element: ''The link with the
paramilitaries did not only exist in Guaviare, but came from Urabá,'' in the
department (state) of Antioquia, which was under the jurisdiction of General
Rito Alejo del Río when Uribe, Colombia's president, was governor of that
department.
Uscátegui pointed out that after the massacre, the 2nd mobile army brigade and
the Joaquín París battalion did not chase down the killers. On the contrary, the
brigade mounted ''a huge operation to smash the FARC and create a security
corridor for the 'paras' (paramilitaries)'' to pull out of the area.
''The army not only has ties with the 'paras', not only does it not fight them,
but it fought off the FARC to keep them from attacking the 'paras' for making an
incursion into guerrilla territory,'' said the retired general.
A 2001 report by the New York-based Human Rights Watch titled ''The 'Sixth
Division': Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia'' explains
that the "Sixth Division" is a phrase used in Colombia to refer to paramilitary
groups.
''Colombia's army has five divisions, but many Colombians told Human Rights
Watch that paramilitaries are so fully integrated into the army's battle
strategy, coordinated with its soldiers in the field, and linked to government
units via intelligence, supplies, radios, weapons, cash, and common purpose that
they effectively constitute a sixth division of the army.''
The Human Rights Watch World Report 2003 shows that the situation has not
changed: ''Mayors, municipal officials, governors, human rights groups, the
public advocate's office, and even some police detachments regularly informed
the appropriate authorities about credible threats by paramilitaries. Yet only
rarely did military forces take effective action to stop paramilitary
advances.''
The London-based Amnesty International's 2003 annual country report on Colombia
says, ''Paramilitaries operating in collusion with the security forces were
responsible for the vast majority of 'disappearances' and killings of
civilians.''
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