COLOMBIA: Half Century of US Military
Presence
Analysis by
Javier Darío Restrepo
BOGOTA (IPS) - In the 1960s, it went
by the name of Latin American Security
Operation, or Plan LASO; today it is known
as Plan Colombia. Back then, the aim was to
weed out communism; now it is to combat drug
trafficking, while at the same time dealing
a blow to the guerrillas.
But at that time or today, the interests of
the United States are at stake, although the
killing takes place in Colombia – whether in
the fight against communists, guerrillas,
drug traffickers, or all of them together.
In May 1964, the teletype machines were
clicking as a United Press International
(UPI) cable arrived from Washington about "a
group of special forces technicians of the
United States Army…sent to Colombia with
(the) purpose of instructing soldiers and
police in counter-guerrilla tactics."
The advisers formed part of a campaign
started by President Alberto Lleras
(1945-1946 and 1958-1962) and continued by
his successor Guillermo León Valencia
(1962-1966).
The UPI cable goes on to say that "one of
the principal tactics employed in the
counter-guerrilla operations was the
implementation of psycho-warfare which
brought about the cooperation and trust of
the indigenous population."
The tactics used in the June 1964 attack on
Marquetalia, a remote mountainous region in
central Colombia, left no doubt as to who
provided the advisers and training for the
Colombian troops that, commanded by Colonel
José Joaquín Matallana, started their
offensive by dropping leaflets from the air
urging local peasant farmers not to support
the guerrillas.
At the same time, loudspeakers from
helicopters blasted messages calling on
local residents to support the army, and
announcing the imminent fall of the
communist leaders operating in the region,
who founded the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) – the main rebel group
today - that year.
A few days later, the bombing and machinegun
fire began in areas where the communists
were reportedly hiding. Shortly afterwards
the helicopters brought in troops. As FARC
founder Jacobo Arenas later recalled, 800
airborne troops were flown in and began to
take control of the highland area, in
combination with troops who were advancing
on the ground.
The tactics, similar to those used in the
Vietnam war (1964-1975), were coordinated
from Neiva, the nearest large town, by U.S.
military advisers.
According to then president Lleras, the
country needed the help, due to the
inadequate training of Colombian troops and
the magnitude of the communist threat.
Today, Colombia is the third-largest
recipient of U.S. military aid in the world,
after Israel and Egypt.
That was then, this is now
Trying to play down the significance of the
Colombian government's decision to give the
U.S. Department of Defence access to between
three and five military bases – the number
is not yet clear – government spokespersons
have said in the last few weeks that it is
merely an extension of Plan Colombia, the
anti-drug and counterinsurgency strategy
financed by Washington since 2000 – which is
partially true.
Over the last 50 years, the U.S. military
presence in Colombia has taken on different
shapes and gone through different phases,
but it has remained steady.
After a Colombian Battalion took part in the
Korean War (1950-1953), this country's
commitment to the fight against communism
became irreversible. Successive governments
and the army were involved in the U.S.-led
defence of the continent against the
"communist threat" until a new danger
emerged: drug trafficking. With the same
enthusiasm, they aligned themselves with the
U.S. in the fight against the drug
traffickers.
Colombia became a U.S. military objective
after several developments coincided.
One was a confidential memo from Peter
Bourne, special adviser on drug abuse to
President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), which
charged that prominent politicians,
including Liberal Party President-elect
Julio César Turbay (1978-1982), had
connections to the drug trade.
The left-wing Colombian magazine Alternativa
went even further, portraying Turbay on its
cover as a Mafia boss.
The influential U.S. magazine Esquire
reported that even high-level Colombian
officials were involved in the trafficking
of marijuana.
It was also reported that thanks to
surveillance flights by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), under Operation
Stopgap, the U.S. Coast Guard was
intercepting Colombian shipments of
marijuana at sea.
To that was added pressure from Carter and
then DEA Administrator Peter Bensinger, who
in the name of Colombia's "national
security" raised the need for counter-drug
military action.
The U.S. military or police presence has
been a constant factor in the Colombian
army's involvement in the fight against
drugs.
It has also been a factor in the campaigns
for the eradication of coca and poppy crops
by aerial spraying of herbicides, and in the
fight against nationalistic opposition to
the extradition of Colombians to be tried on
drug charges in the United States. A record
number of 800 people were extradited during
the two terms of current right-wing
President Álvaro Uribe.
At other times, the U.S. military presence
had to do with the installation of radars,
nominally to carry out surveillance of drug
flights, but actually to gain effective
control over the airspace from strategic
points.
Direct actions
To these forms of influence are added
different operations, like naval manoeuvres
with which the U.S. navy and air force make
their presence felt around the world.
President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990)
complained about anti-drug manoeuvres in
Colombian waters by the nuclear cruiser USS
Virginia and the aircraft carrier USS John
F. Kennedy, which caused tension with the
administration of George Bush (1989-1993).
Shortly before that incident, then Defence
Secretary Richard Cheney (1989-1993)
declared the war on drugs a "high-priority
national security mission."
Then Attorney General Dick Thornburgh said
at the time that the United States was
prepared to send troops to Colombia, if the
Barco administration requested it.
The Colombian newspaper El Espectador
reported on Feb. 10, 1989 that the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) would create
specialised anti-drug commandos.
Former Los Angeles County District Attorney
Vincent Bugliosi went so far as to write
that invasion was not only a right, but a
duty because of the threat that the drug
trade posed to U.S. sovereignty.
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich seconded
the idea of invading countries with serious
drug trafficking problems. At a
congressional hearing in October 2000,
Republican Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana
said "Colombia's fate is a national security
threat to the United States." Against that
backdrop, the scandal that broke out in 1994
when U.S. marines disembarked and built a
school in Juanchaco, a fishing village on
Colombia's southwest Pacific coast, was at
the very least overblown.
When U.S. resources and advisers shifted
their focus and instead of going after drug
traffickers began to pursue guerrillas, the
U.S. military presence in Colombia took on
new connotations.
As clearly stated by former Colombian
Foreign Minister Alfredo Vásquez in 1991:
"The military assistance is aimed at
fighting the guerrillas."
More dramatic evidence of that was when FARC
insurgents shot down a small plane in
February 2003 transporting U.S military
contractors who were carrying out
surveillance in a rebel-controlled area. The
three were held hostage in the jungle until
their rescue in a July 2008 army operation.
U.S. military action in Colombia has gone
beyond more limits than are readily
apparent. The United States government has
demanded legal immunity for U.S. military
personnel, obtained information that it has
not shared, caused mistakes like a bombing
of civilians in Candelaria in the north of
the country, and is now jeopardising this
country's relations with the governments of
neighbouring countries.
The negative reaction by Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez and others to the
announcement that the U.S. would be given
access to Colombian military bases did not
receive any reassuring response, but only a
vague promise by Uribe that they would only
be used to go after "drug traffickers" and
"terrorists."
In his report to Congress, the Colombian
president tried to calm worries over the
decision. But neighbouring countries and
Colombians who have followed with concern
the foreign armed presence in their national
territory for half a century are anything
but calm. |
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