Nicaragua Under the Second Coming of the Sandinistas
Last November 9, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN)
won majorities in most of a series of municipal elections throughout
Nicaragua. Because these elections were the first since the national
balloting in 2006, in which the FSLN captured the presidency as well
as gained influence in the National Assembly, they offer a
significant indication of the relative positions of the ruling FSLN
and other political parties in the country.
However, the nature of the balloting did not provide a complete view
of the relative position of the parties or other political groups in
the country. The fact is, according to members of the opposition,
numerous critics, and the relatively few observers who were present
to record what they saw and heard, there were numerous incidents
regarding problems with the conduct of the elections, the counting
of the ballots, and perhaps most importantly, with the arrogant
attitude of the government.
The Sandinistas won the elections handily, with victories in 105 of
146 races, while the opposition Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)
took only 37 seats, and minor parties won 4. Moreover, the
Sandinistas captured the mayoralty of Managua, a position considered
second in importance only to the position of the presidency. These
election triumphs brought great jubilation to FSLN loyalists.
However, the elections in general lacked many of the democratic
features of other Central American elections, and, in fact, in
Nicaragua itself. Many irregularities were reported, international
observers were not permitted to function (although a few were
present anyway), and there was considerable post-election violence
between partisans, resulting in numerous injuries.
Ortega as Seen from Washington
Because of some of the ambiguities surrounding the elections’
legitimacy, the U.S. State Department dredged up complaints which
were familiar during past occasions when the Sandinistas controlled
the government and as seen from Washington, Daniel Ortega could do
nothing right. Moreover, Washington acted to suspend economic
assistance to the country for three months on the grounds that the
elections were not conducted democratically. There did appear to be
an abundance of evidence that the elections could have been staged
more in keeping with Managua’s insistence about their democratic
nature. But what can be said about the course of this and other
events in the country, many of them distinctly controversial, since
the return of the Sandinistas?
When Daniel Ortega first came into power on January 11, 2007, the
end of the preceding conservative Bolanos administration was
characterized as just “limping to the finish line.” It was a
government which in fact had accomplished little and although
Bolanos had worked to abolish corruption, which was one of his
distinctive commitments after taking office, the country still
ranked as the most venal in Central America, even after twenty years
of post-Sandinista rule. So, in fact, the new government had nowhere
to go but forwards.
It was predicted early in his term that Ortega rule would in fact
have to face a “tricky balancing act,” as one Costa Rican newspaper
called it. The country was deeply divided among competing groups;
the Sandinista Party had broken into several factions; the country
was facing divisions among ideological blocs; the country had to
deal with the complexities of its relationship with the “colossus of
the north,” which had done virtually everything in its power to
undermine the electoral process that had brought Ortega into office;
and Ortega’s rule would be bedeviled by the fact that he was at best
a minority presidential candidate who received only enough votes to
defeat the other minority candidates by relatively narrow margins.
This is the position from which Ortega had to begin his
administration in order to face problems dealing with poverty,
illness, poor educational services and crime. Intent on bettering
relations with the United States, he promptly began to forge new
images of peace, concord, and reconciliation. He also strived to
better relations with the Church, one of his master poles of
opposition.
Views of Ortega and conceptions of how he might be able to deal with
such issues have varied widely. Some have referred to him as a
“fascist,” others have called him simply, “stupid,” while others
have called him a “frustrated” socialist. Others point to his long
and deeply controversial sordid ties to Arnoldo Aléman as
undermining his credibility. But, by and large, Ortega can best be
considered as a very ambitious would-be reformer of the poorest
country in Central America. His goals appear to be driven by the
forces of reform and by an attempt, by often very controversial
methods, to leave his mark upon the image of Nicaragua. It is in
this way that his methods often appear to provoke enemies and to
leave insoluble problems in his wake, rather than by invoking
solutions. But, although his personal conduct tends to create
controversy, he certainly will be long remembered in the history of
Nicaragua. Now, what are some of the accomplishments for which
Ortega deserves to be remembered and for which he will be
bequeathing to his country’s history?
The Good and the Ugly
On Ortega’s plus side are a number of accomplishments that must
begin with his self-perceived status as “El Pueblo Presidente” (The
People are President) approach to public projects. An example of
this is his promotion of the new Granada-Nandaime highway as a
symbol of his nation-wide “offensive against unpaved highways and
roads. As he describes it, the building of highways like this one is
part of a general “The Streets are for the People” program that will
construct 1502 km. of highways in municipalities throughout the
country, It should also be noted that this is part of a $26 million
program funded under the auspices of the Bolivarian Alternative for
the Americas (ALBA), with assistance from Venezuela. It was publicly
argued as helping poor people to have first-class streets that will
help to build pride in their neighborhoods.
Another innovative program is Ortega’s “Agro Revolution.”
Considering that food is the centerpiece of his government’s
National Security strategy, a virtual agricultural revolution is
currently taking place in Nicaragua’s countryside in which the
public sector is playing an increasingly formidable role. This means
that through the medium of cooperatives that work closely with the
government, a new reform initiative is now addressing the repairing
of roads, clearing landmines, and cultivating a million manzanas (a
unit of land) throughout the country. This is part of an ambitious
program called Hambre Cero (Zero Hunger) whose objective the total
elimination of hunger in Nicaragua. The specific goal is to pull
75,000 families out of poverty and hunger within five years. The
program is budgeted at $150 million and is considered to be part of
the UN Millennium Development Goal that is designed to eradicate
extreme poverty in the world and to reduce hunger to zero, with
heavy international funding.
Ortega’s Pluses
Some critics call the current Nicaraguan program merely another form
of socialism because it will be based on a broad system of
cooperatives. However, the goal is actually to create agricultural
independence in Nicaragua in order to counter U.S. and European
subsidized agricultural products, many of which have gained greater
market access under the Washington promoted Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Ortega has said that he would rather appeal
to other Latin American countries (including Venezuela, in
particular) for assistance than to go to the United Nations, Europe
or, in particular, to the United States.
Another achievement of the Ortega government is the conflation, and
centralized encouragement of a free market system in Nicaragua while
at the same time managing to talk favorably about socialism. While
talking about the latter approach to solving problems, Ortega has in
fact endorsed the free market system and has gone so far as to give
his personal endorsement to the concept. Although Ortega has bashed
“savage capitalism” and has talked about spreading socialism around
Latin America, he also has advocated the creation of agricultural
cooperatives which will embrace the poorest campesinos, who will be
able to to coexist and compete with multilateral corporations and
private farmers. In other words, he evidently now rejects his
earlier ideas of creating a doctrinaire Marxist economy in
Nicaragua. According to economists’ studies on the subject, the
Ortega government has been working toward the development of an
export-based economy in which state-run and private organizations
will be able to co-exist and compete within a democratic
governmental system.
Another laudable program being overseen by Oretga’s staff has the
goal of eliminating illiteracy in the country by July 17 of this
year. There is nothing very new about this ambitious aspiration.
After all, in the 1980’s the Sandinistas used their Literacy Crusade
to eliminate illiteracy when they were in power.
Ortega’s Critics Voice Another Type of Critique
Ortega has continuously been allied with President Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela, and his theoretical principles have secured a good deal
of economic assistance through his relationship with his Venezuelan
counterpart. Ortega’s close relationship with Chavez has
unquestionably brought considerable benefits to Nicaragua in the
form of economic assistance as well as membership in the
Castro-Chavez ALBA initiative. This also has made Washington very
uncomfortable, obviously because one of the clearly stated goals of
ALBA is to reduce the U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
The benefits Nicaragua has derived through the Ortega presidency
have been considerable, and the above list contains only a sampling
of the more noteworthy ones. But, as pointed out earlier, Ortega,
once in power, has inevitably become a very controversial character.
To begin with, Ortega has not been an easy colleague upon for which
to rely. He has alienated an unusually high percentage of his allies
and supporters in the original Sandinista Party for a wide range of
reasons. These include his former Vice-President, Sergio Ramirez,
the Cardenal brothers, and numerous other allies from the days when
the FSLN was the ruling party. The most frequently offered grounds
for this alienation is that he has yielded to expedience and an
unquenchable lust for personal power and that principle has not
always driven him.
According to a poll taken during the spring of 2008, some 64 percent
of Nicaraguans said that Ortega is an “authoritarian figure acting
to establish” a personal dictatorship. Without a doubt this is the
severest criticism of his current administration, and plenty of
evidence is offered by his critics to support the claim. For one
thing, he has been particularly hostile to the press, as well as to
former colleagues and allies. Dora Maria Tellez, who was a colleague
and an ardent supporter in the 1980’s, recently led a hunger strike
in downtown Managua to protest his authoritarian intentions to
abolish press criticism and opposition from anyone who disagrees
with his policies.
The Nature of Dictatorship
Moreover, Dona Maria’s widely noted criticism has fostered a popular
discussion of the nature of dictatorship in his country. As critics
have pointed out, the government has not created a dictatorship like
that of the Somoza era. It also has been pointed out that the
President might be better described as being “authoritarian,” rather
than “dictatorial.” The country sees no secret police and no
military on the ready, nor strongman rule as existed in
revolutionary times. At the same time it would be incorrect to call
the government truly democratic; perhaps it could be better defined
as basically “under-democratic,” because it lacks a division of
powers and the rule of law, and a strongly-applied constituency
traits that would be found in other truly democratic states.
An example of anti-democratic imperfections on the part of the
modern-day Sandinistas can be seen in the September, 2008 attack by
masked Sandinista partisans (or “thugs” as they are now being called
by the press) against a peaceful protest march by former Sandinista
Party members who had joined the Sandinista Renovation Movement and
who were now accusing Ortega of being a dictator. Dona Maria called
the attack “pure fascism,” and accused Ortega of using these kinds
of tactics to crush the opposition, and other political parties and
to instill fear in the people — all so “he can stay in power.” But
there is no evidence that Ortega in any way endorsed the attack.
Perhaps a somewhat more valid criticism is that Ortega has not done
enough to end the food crisis in the country; which primarily, has
consisted of high prices on both food and cooking oil caused by
inflation, which has risen by 5 percent for 2008. Indeed, according
to various estimates, the majority of poor families in Nicaragua
spend 75 percent of their family income just to keep food on the
table. Ortega’s answer to such grim numbers is that the “tyranny of
global capitalism” or neo-liberalism, is the real cause of rising
food prices. And many experts claim that he could be somewhat
correct in embracing some of these judgments although there
certainly are other explanations as well. As Ortega points out, the
neo-liberal model of agriculture has reduced food availability in
poor countries, and should thus be protested. But his critics insist
that his creation of agricultural cooperatives and attempts to
impose ill-administered and corruption-strewn “socialistic” policies
on food production are the real causes of higher prices everywhere.
Then there basically is the impaired economic situation of the
country, which has been worsened by the current world-wide economic
crisis. One can claim that to an extent, this has been alleviated by
Ortega’s cooperative relationship with Chavez..Venezuela has
allocated a good deal of subsidized petroleum to Nicaragua over the
past two years. So, Ortega’s good relationship with Chavez has
certainly paid off. In fact, Ortega has correctly observed that the
U.S. recession could actually somewhat ease the severity of the oil
crisis in Nicaragua by bringing down world-wide prices.
Currently, Nicaragua is involved in a three-year program with the
International Monetary Fund that began in 2007, under the previous
government. Recommendations have been made that the country ought to
protect and nurture its few and fragile hard currency earning
sectors, namely tourism, trade, industry, and commerce. In fact,
Francisco Aguirre, the head of the country’s Economic Commission
observed that the President should work more to resolve problems. It
should also be stressed that the three-month suspension of U.S. aid
has certainly done nothing to ease the country’s economic crisis. In
fact, the loss of the aid has seriously hurt the country’s economy
more than any other single action over the last few months.
There are certainly other criticisms that can be directed to Daniel
Ortega’s substantive program and operating style, including his
sclerotic temper that tends toward dealing harshly with those who
have the temerity to question his policies. His commitment toward
using socialistic solutions to resolve economic problems can be
explained in part by his close association with Chavez of Venezuela
and in part by his own perhaps distant political values as a
Sandinista. Moreover, while he certainly is obsessed with a personal
odium towards Washington, this can be explained by the fact that the
State Department had done everything in its power to bring about his
electoral defeat both in 1990 and in 2006. Finally, he certainly
always hasn’t proven to be a very tactful national leader, even
toward other regional officials, including those in Central America.
By and large, however, it can be said that Daniel Ortega has been a
better president with far greater concern about his country’s living
standards and its attitude toward its poor and deprived majority,
than any Nicaraguan president since the defeat of the Sandinistas in
1990. And, he has been far more successful than almost any other
Nicaraguan president in standing up to Washington’s desires to
manipulate and dominate the country.
This analysis was prepared by COHA Senior Research Fellow Dr. Frank
J. Kendrick |
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