ECUADOR:
Manta Air Base Tied to
Colombian Raid on FARC
Camp
By Kintto Lucas
MANTA, Ecuador (IPS) -
Military and diplomatic
sources see a link
between the Manta air
base, operated by the
United States in
Ecuadorean territory,
and this month’s bombing
raid by Colombia on a
FARC guerrilla camp in
Ecuador.
The U.S. air force was
granted a 10-year
concession in 1999 to
use the base, located in
the port city of Manta
on Ecuador’s northern
Pacific coast, in its
counter-drug trafficking
activities in the
region.
A high-level Ecuadorean
military officer, who
preferred to remain
anonymous, told IPS that
"a large proportion of
senior officers" in
Ecuador share "the
conviction that the
United States was an
accomplice in the
attack" launched Mar. 1
by the Colombian
military on a FARC
(Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia) camp
in Ecuador, near the
Colombian border.
FARC’s international
spokesman Raúl Reyes and
24 other people were
killed in the bombing
raid, which prompted
Quito to break off
diplomatic relations
with Colombia, although
ties were restored
several days later.
"Since Plan Colombia was
launched in 2000, a
strategic alliance
between the United
States and Colombia has
taken shape, first to
combat the insurgents
and later to involve
neighbouring countries
in that war," said the
officer. "What is
happening today is a
consequence of that."
Plan Colombia is a
U.S.-financed and
supported
counterinsurgency and
anti-drug strategy
carried out by Bogotá.
The information gathered
by IPS from military and
diplomatic sources
indicates that the Manta
air base played a role
in locating, and
carrying out
reconnaissance of, the
FARC camp in Ecuador.
Ecuadorean Defence
Minister Wellington
Sandoval said there
should be an
investigation of whether
the Manta air base was
used for the attack on
the rebel camp in
Ecuador. According to
the agreement signed by
Washington and Quito, it
is the Ecuadorean armed
forces that should carry
out such a probe.
The Manta air base lease
clearly stipulates that
the base can only be
used for
counter-narcotics
operations.
Sandoval said he cannot
provide any information
until an investigation
has been conducted.
The military source who
spoke to IPS said that
what should be verified
"above all are the
flights from the base in
the 20 days prior to the
bombing, who was on
them, the routes they
took, and what they were
investigating. This data
should be complemented
by other inquiries and
information."
On Mar. 13, Ecuadorean
Foreign Minister María
Isabel Salvador said she
had had "a conversation
with (U.S.) Ambassador
Linda Jewell who ensured
us that the planes (at
the base) were not
involved in any way" in
the bombing of the FARC
camp.
But the military source
said that "the
technology used, first
to locate the target, in
other words the camp,
and later to attack it,
was from the United
States."
Sandoval declared that
"equipment that the
Latin American armed
forces do not have" was
used in the Mar. 1
bombing.
"They dropped around
five 'smart bombs'," the
kind used by the United
States in the First Gulf
War (1991), "with
impressive precision and
a margin of error of
just one metre, at
night, from planes
travelling at high
speeds," said the
minister.
The military source said
that "an attack with
smart bombs requires
pilots who have
experience in such
operations, which means
U.S. pilots. That’s why
I think they did the job
and later told the
Colombians ‘now go in
and find the bodies’,
which is when Colombian
helicopters and troops
showed up" at the site
of the raid.
According to the
official version of
events that the
Colombian government
gave an Organisation of
American States (OAS)
fact-finding commission
that visited both
countries, 10
"conventional" bombs
were dropped from five
Brazilian-made Super
Tucano aircraft and
three U.S.-made A-37
planes.
The A-37s dropped bombs
guided by GPS (Global
Positioning System) and
the five Super Tucanos
have the technological
means to launch bombs at
targets with a five-metre
margin of error, said
the OAS delegation’s
report.
But according to the
sources who spoke to IPS,
the U.S. role in the
incident could have been
even greater.
The military officer
said the bombing raid in
Ecuadorean air space was
actually led by "U.S.
pilots, possibly from
DynCorp," a U.S.-based
private military
contractor that has
contracts under Plan
Colombia.
The aircraft took off
from the Tres Esquinas
air base in the southern
Colombian department of
Caquetá, said the
source.
"The planes used to
fumigate coca crops or
to attack the guerrillas
are piloted by serving
members of the U.S.
military or (former)
military men at the
service of companies
like DynCorp," said the
officer.
Ecuadorean President
Rafael Correa said on
Mar. 15 that his
government would not
allow "any foreign
soldier, whether regular
or irregular, to affect
the soil of our
fatherland. That is why
there will be no more
foreign bases after
2009."
U.S. usage rights for
Manta expire on Nov. 12,
2009.
A committee in the
Constituent Assembly
that is rewriting the
Ecuadorean constitution
approved the chapter on
territorial sovereignty
on Mar. 17.
One of the articles
states that "Ecuador is
a territory of peace.
The establishment of
foreign military bases,
or foreign installations
for military purposes,
is not permitted.
National military bases
cannot be leased to
foreign security
forces."
In its refusal to renew
the air base lease,
Ecuador can argue "many
causes: direct or
indirect participation
(by U.S. forces from
Manta) in the bombing;
negligence for failure
to detect the FARC camp
with their technology,
first of all, and the
attack, in second place;
and, in case they did
detect the camp and the
raid, for failing to
inform authorities in
the partner country,
Ecuador," said a
diplomatic source who
spoke with IPS on
condition of anonymity.
Another reason that
could be set forth is
the direct support that
the U.S. Southern
Command, under which the
U.S. armed forces at the
Manta air base operate,
has provided the
Colombian military.
Admiral James Stavridis,
the commander of the
Southern Command, told
the U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee on
Mar. 6 that he was
monitoring the movement
of Ecuadorean and
Venezuelan troops to the
Colombian border.
Stavridis said that with
continuous U.S. support,
Colombia has won
"hard-fought successes"
in the armed conflict.
He added that "this key
strategic ally" was
making irreversible
progress towards peace
and against "terrorism."
He also told the Senate
Committee that the FARC
had been reduced from
17,500 guerrillas in
2002 to around 9,000
today.
In July 2001, retired
colonel Fausto Cobo,
former director of the
Ecuadorean army’s
Escuela de Guerra (war
collage), had told IPS
that "Manta, for the
purposes of Plan
Colombia," is a "U.S.
aircraft carrier, on
land."
By April 2001, when work
began on the expansion
of the Manta air strip,
an average of 100 troops
were taking part in up
to three missions a day
in F-3 reconnaissance
planes.
A diplomatic source from
the United States told
Britain’s Financial
Times at the time that
by October the number
would go up by 200, and
by 200 more within the
following few months.
After the expansion of
the air strip, bigger,
more sophisticated
aircraft began to be
used for reconnaissance
missions.
Manta is one of the four
"forward operating
locations" (FOLs), along
with Curaçao, Aruba and
El Salvador, that make
up the U.S. network of
counter-narcotics bases
in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
In August 2006, the
Expreso de Guayaquil
newspaper reported that
Colombian pilots were
operating alongside
Ecuadorean pilots on
flights out of the Manta
air base.
The commander of an
Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS)
squadron based out of
Manta, Rich Boyd, told
the Guayaquil newspaper
that one of the AWACS
aircraft was operated by
a Colombian air force
officer.
But Boyd said that each
country's sensitive and
confidential information
is protected, because
the Colombian officer
exits the cockpit when
the plane is in
Ecuadorean air space,
and the Ecuadorean pilot
leaves when the plane
overflies Colombia.
According to Boyd, three
of the U.S. military’s
27 AWACS were at the
Manta base. Each one has
a price tag of one
billion dollars --
nearly double the entire
2005 budget of the
Ecuadorean air force.
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