ARGENTINA:
The Return of the "Cacerolazo"
Analysis by Marcela
Valente
BUENOS AIRES (IPS)
- Thousands of
middle-class Argentines
took to the streets late
Tuesday in a "cacerolazo"
or pot-banging protest,
this time against the
centre-left government
of President Cristina
Fernández, showing that
the methods learned in
the crisis that broke
out in late 2001 are
still alive.
"The social and
political memory is not
in our minds, but in our
bodies. Faced with the
need to mark limits for
political action by a
government, society acts
based on what it has
learned," sociologist
Federico Schuster, dean
of the social science
department at the
University of Buenos
Aires, told IPS.
"Neighbourhood
assemblies, ‘piquetes’
(roadblocks) and
‘cacerolazos’ were very
strong experiences that
are latent but still
alive. The return to a
certain institutional
normalcy does not mean
that this spirit of
rebellion has completely
disappeared. In the face
of a new disappointment,
the mechanisms are
activated," said the
professor.
However, there is an
enormous difference
between the contexts in
which the current
protests are taking
place and those that
brought down the
government of Fernando
De la Rúa in December
2001.
While Argentina was
already in a deep
recession back in late
2001, the crisis facing
Fernández today is
occurring in the midst
of strong economic
recovery and a heated
debate on how the
country’s growing wealth
should be distributed.
One common denominator,
however, is the lack of
mechanisms for mediation
in conflicts between the
government and civil
society.
"The government should
encourage the creation
of decentralised spaces
for debate in different
sectors of society,
which would enable it to
maintain a dialogue with
everyone, especially in
times of crisis. Because
it is not enough to just
vote every four years,"
said Schuster.
The current conflict
broke out two weeks ago,
when the government
announced a new sliding
scale of higher taxes on
grain exports, which
were increased from 35
to 44 percent in the
case of soybeans and
from 32 to 39 percent in
the case of sunflowers,
for example.
The new taxes, announced
on Mar. 11, will vary
depending on
international grain
prices, rising as prices
go up or shrinking as
they drop.
The measure was
immediately protested by
small, medium and large
farmers, who are
enjoying a boom period
thanks to their own
efficient production
methods, the rallying of
global markets and
soaring demand for
commodities, and support
from the state by means
of fuel subsidies and a
competitive exchange
rate.
For the past two weeks,
farmers have been
staging roadblocks
around the country. At
first, they blocked the
passage of trucks
carrying grains. But the
lack of dialogue between
the rural associations
and the government has
fuelled the
confrontation, and the
traffic blockades are
now targeting trucks
transporting any kind of
food in towns and cities
in many of the country’s
provinces.
The farm strike has led
to the dumping of
millions of litres of
milk that could not be
sold, and to the
slaughter on Tuesday of
400,000 chicks which
were waiting in vain for
their feed.
Shortages of fresh
produce and other farm
products have already
begun to be felt in
supermarkets and shops
in Buenos Aires.
The government,
meanwhile, has refused
to roll back the new
tax. The president said
Tuesday that the
roadblocks, by contrast
with the "piquetes"
staged by groups of
unemployed workers in
the late 1990s, are "piquetes
of abundance," and
stated that she would
not be subject to
"extortion."
"How else can wealth be
distributed but from
those sectors enjoying
windfall profits?" asked
Fernandez, who pointed
out that in 2003 the
state came to the rescue
of tens of thousands of
bankrupt farmers on the
verge of losing their
land.
In response to the
president’s statements
and her refusal to
negotiate, thousands of
people, mainly from
upscale neighbourhoods
in Buenos Aires and
other cities, took to
the streets to clang
pots and pans, as they
did during the late 2001
crisis.
The most determined
demonstrators marched
spontaneously towards
the Plaza de Mayo,
outside of the Casa
Rosada (the seat of
government), and to the
doors of the Olivos
presidential residency,
while others gathered on
street corners.
Some complained about
the government’s failure
to engage in dialogue,
others defended the
right of farmers to
their growing profit
margin, and many were
simply expressing angry
opposition to the
government.
Protests were not seen
in poor suburbs of the
capital, or in the
metropolitan area, where
people followed events
on TV.
In response to the
unexpected
demonstration, "piquetero"
groups (of unemployed
workers) that support
the Fernández
administration took to
the streets and forced
the "cacerolazo"
protesters to break up.
A few hours later, the
government once again
confirmed that the farm
export tax hike would
remain in place, and
threatened to call out
the police to break up
the roadblocks on rural
highways.
Justice Minister Anibal
Fernández warned
Wednesday that the
security forces would
remove the traffic
blockades to allow the
trucks to get through
with grains and food
supplies. "If they don't
move, we'll move them
ourselves," said the
minister. "Those who do
not allow the traffic
through will go to
jail."
Economy Minister Martín
Lousteau said the "cacerolazo"
was "staged and
instigated by opposition
leaders" among "the
urban upper middle
class, who have nothing
to do with the rural
sector."
But observers agree
that, although the
opposition parties were
represented in the
streets and their
leaders have attempted
to make political hay
out of the protests, the
demonstrations in the
cities were spontaneous.
"It was a major event,
and its significance
cannot be played down.
The government is not
going to be the same
after this," said
Schuster, who wrote the
Argentine chapter of the
book "The New Left in
Latin America", which
was written by a diverse
group of social
scientists from around
the region.
In his chapter, Schuster
said that shortly after
he took office, former
president Néstor
Kirchner (2003-2007),
Fernández’s husband,
demobilised social
movements that had
emerged during the
2001-2002 economic
crisis and the preceding
years of recession.
By means of strategies
aimed at recuperating a
degree of control over
the discontent,
Kirchner, "instead of
taking advantage of the
momentum of the
decentralised protests
that emerged in those
years, silenced the
movements."
"He did not have a
strategy to mobilise
citizens, and that is
not advisable if you
plan to confront large
vested interests," the
academic wrote at the
time.
The strategy aimed at
getting people to
demobilise "might be
effective in the short
term, but in the medium
term it will be
counterproductive for
the government itself,"
Schuster warned in 2004.
"Experiences don't die,
they are mechanisms that
can be activated at any
time. If the government
is truly progressive, it
will need to awaken
that."
But that is not what has
happened. At the end of
his term, Kirchner
announced that he would
focus on rebuilding the
Justicialista (Peronist)
Party, to provide his
wife’s government with a
solid political base.
According to Schuster,
however, "the old way of
doing politics will not
suffice to keep a lid on
these new forms of
participation."
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