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SPECIAL REPORTS
- Thursday
06 January 2005
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CHALLENGES
2004-2005:
Risks Posed by South America's
Growing Ties to China
Diana
Cariboni
MONTEVIDEO, (IPS) - While the
United States has its gaze
trained elsewhere, China has
been nudging its way into South
America.
Its influence could perpetuate a
weak economic model based on
commodity exports, and
exacerbate the already serious
problem of corruption, according
to analysts, who identify these
as the immediate risks posed by
the sudden interest in this
region expressed by the Asian
giant.
Given that China has the
potential to become a major new
presence in South America over
the next two decades, it could
also contribute to a significant
change in the balance of
geopolitical and economic forces
in the hemisphere, say some
observers.
The importance of this region
for China was underscored by
President Hu Jintao's visit to
three South American countries
in November: Brazil, Argentina
and Chile. (He also stopped over
in Cuba).
Latin America and the Caribbean
currently account for just 3.2
percent of China's trade with
the rest of the world.
But for this region, China
represents a market of 1.3
billion people.
For Brazil, which accounts for
half of South America's combined
gross domestic product (GDP),
China is now the second biggest
export market. Brazil's sales to
China climbed 153 percent in
2003, with respect to 2002.
Beijing has signed a free trade
accord with Mexico, and is
negotiating another with Chile,
a country with which it did 3.29
billion dollars in trade in
2003, up 35 percent from the
previous year.
”China's planners are well aware
of the country's internal
strengths and weaknesses” and
”operate with anticipation,
lining up markets and business
platforms that guarantee
long-term growth,” Sergio
Cesarin, an Argentine economist
who holds a masters degree in
economics from the University of
Beijing, told IPS.
Companies and the government
form a ”symbiosis of interests
that is part of the success of
the model of 'Chinese
capitalism' or 'Chinese-style
socialism',” he said.
China is a powerful motor that
needs raw materials to sustain
its growth, which has averaged
more than eight percent a year
over the past decade. Its
enormous appetite has been
responsible for the overall rise
in commodity prices.
According to the Asian
Development Bank, China is the
world's biggest consumer of
copper, tin, zinc, platinum,
steel and iron. Last year it
gobbled up 40 percent of the
world's steel, 30 percent of
coal, 30 percent of steel and 25
percent of aluminum and copper.
Economists link Latin America's
strong economic growth in 2004
to the rise in Chinese imports
of raw materials.
Furthermore, China is among the
five leading investors in this
region, and for the first time
overtook Japan in 2003, which
put it in fourth place, after
the United States, Britain and
France, according to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).
In his speech in the Brazilian
parliament in November, Hu said
his country would invest 100
billion dollars in Latin America
over the next 10 years. He also
talked about strengthening the
”strategic partnership” between
the two countries.
China is seeking to ”expand its
political influence, markets and
networks of business contacts
for its companies,” said Cesarin,
coordinator of Pacific Studies
in the Institute of Social
Science Research at the
Argentine National Council on
Scientific and Technological
Research.
Several heavily indebted
countries in this region,
especially Argentina and Brazil,
are finding relief in their
rising exports of farm
commodities like soy beans to
China, while others are seeking
a route to growth that differs
from the free market, structural
adjustment model followed in the
past 20 years, largely as a
result of prescriptions from the
international financial
institutions in Washington.
The nations of Latin America are
in need of liquidity and
financing. In 2003, foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the
region dropped nine percent, to
36.7 billion dollars. In 1998,
the year that privatisations
peaked, FDI amounted to 88
billion dollars.
At the same time that ties with
China have been growing, the
United States has distanced
itself from this region.
Washington's top priority has
been the ”war on terrorism”, and
progress towards its project for
hemispheric integration, the
Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), has stalled.
Without any traumatic history of
relations with Latin America,
China's overtures have not
awakened a sense of wariness or
apprehension.
Beijing, which is stepping into
”a vacuum of ties left by the
United States, has well-oiled
political relations with the
centre-left governments that
predominate in the region, a
positive public image, and the
overseas networks of Chinese
nationals, who are involved in
bilateral relations,” said
Cesarin.
But South America, and more
specifically the Southern Common
Market (Mercosur) trade bloc
that consists of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, do
not seem to have any clearly
defined strategy for developing
business ties with the Asian
giant.
Despite the high-level meetings
that Beijing and Mercosur have
held since 1997 (the most recent
took place in July), the bloc is
just beginning to ”build” a
strategy to guide the forging of
closer ties with China, Eduardo
Sigal, under-secretary of
integration in the Argentine
foreign ministry, admitted to
IPS in November.
But while Mercosur attempts to
come up with a coherent
strategy, Hu found it to be a
relatively simple matter to get
Brazil, Argentina, Chile and
Peru to recognise China as a
market economy - a status it
does not enjoy in the World
Trade Organisation (WTO).
That step drew protests from
industrialists in Brazil and
Argentina, who are traditionally
divided by trade disputes, but
are now united in their
complaints about the threats to
the barriers that currently
protect them from the ”dumping”
- the export of products at
prices deemed artificially low -
of cheap Chinese goods.
South America is running a risk
”if we establish relations that
increase our vulnerability to
the ups and downs of commodity
prices,” said Cesarin.
The error, he said, ”is not
sitting down to reflect.”
”We need China to help drive an
improvement in the manufacturing
capacity and the diversification
of the export base in our
countries,” he maintained.
Mexico is one example not to be
emulated. Many businesses in
industries like footwear,
clothing and glass have found it
impossible to compete with
Chinese products, which are up
to 60 percent cheaper.
China's exports to Mexico soared
from 195 million dollars in 1989
to over four billion in 2002,
and 300 ”maquiladoras” or export
assembly plants have left for
China.
Corruption is another grey area
in the newfound proximity
between South America and China.
Graft, rather than drug
trafficking, is the source of 70
percent of the ”dirty money”
laundered in Brazil, where only
one-third of the resources
disbursed by the government
actually reach their intended
destination, according to the
director of the international
legal department of the
Brazilian Attorney General's
Office.
In the Corruption Perceptions
Index 2004 report released by
the global anti-corruption
watchdog Transparency
International, China received a
score of 3.4 on a scale of one
to 10, with 10 representing
squeaky clean.
In South America, Brazil was
given a score of 3.9, Argentina
2.5 and Paraguay 1.9. Chile and
Uruguay stood out in the region,
with scores of 7.4 and 6.2,
respectively.
In China, ”the level of
corruption is high, as it is in
Latin America,” said Cesarin.
The Chinese ”are often involved
in money laundering, as is a
large part of the Latin American
elites.”
A business source involved in
the promotion of Asian
investment in the region
admitted to IPS that there is a
”sensation” of ”shady” business
dealings and money coming from
China or Hong Kong for
apparently unprofitable business
endeavours that could mask money
laundering activities.
Since China prohibits the
withdrawal of deposits, ”money
from corruption has to be
laundered somehow,” said the
source, who did not want to be
identified.
According to a 2002 report by
the official Chinese newspaper
the People's Daily, money
laundering was equivalent to
nearly two percent of GDP in
2001 and to 11 percent of the
country's foreign reserves.
The fourth generation of Chinese
leaders, who rose to power in
March 2003, are aware of the
”Trojan horse” of corruption,
according to the book ”China's
New Rulers: The Secret Files”,
published in November 2002 by
The New York Review of Books.
But they are divided over how to
tackle the problem, say the
authors.
While Hu defends strict
regulations for the recruitment,
training and promotion of
members of the ruling Communist
Party, including investigations
and interrogations, other
leaders believe that is not
sufficient.
They advocate measures of
popular oversight, which they
describe as ”democracy”, like
limited competitive elections
and partially free media, as
ways to put some limits on
power.
But in China there is no
movement like the perestroika
that brought down the Soviet
Union in 1991, say the authors
Andrew Nathan, a professor at
the University of Columbia, and
Bruce Gilley, a doctoral student
at Princeton University and a
former contributing editor at
the Far Eastern Economic Review.
Anyone who would have dared to
express the view that the
party's monopoly on power should
come to an end would not have
survived the selection process
for the Politburo's Standing
Committee, says the book, which
is based on leaked information
provided by a Chinese informant.
”The question is how to keep
corrupt politicians in our
countries from doing business
with similar agents from China,”
said Cesarin.
But in his view, ”the problem is
not these people themselves, but
those who govern us, who have
the obligation of designing
collective policies and
strategies” to fight graft.
The coming year will be key,
because the agreements and
negotiations in progress will
begin to delineate the magnitude
of China's influence in the
region. |
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